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Abstract
Besides temporal information explicitly avail-
able in verbs and adjuncts, the temporal in-
terpretation of a text also depends on general
world knowledge and default assumptions. We
will present a theory for describing the relation
between, on the one hand, verbs, their tenses
and adjuncts and, on the other, the eventuali-
ties and periods of time they represent and their
relative temporal locations.
The theory is formulated in logic and is a
practical implementation of the concepts de-
scribed in Ness Schelkens et al. (this volume).
We will show how an abductive resolution pro-
cedure can be used on this representation to ex-
tract temporal information from texts.
1 Introduction
This article presents some work conducted in
the framework of Linguaduct, a project on
the temporal interpretation of Dutch texts by
means of abductive reasoning.
A natural language text contains a lot of
both explicit and implicit temporal information,
mostly in verbs and adjuncts. The purpose of
the theory presented here is to represent how
this information is available in Dutch texts with
the aim of allowing extraction of that informa-
tion from particular texts.1 The extracted infor-
mation contains the temporal relations between
the eventualities described in the text as well
as relations to periods of time explicitly or im-
plicitly described in the text. To arrive at this
information some (limited) reasoning needs to
be performed on the representation.
The theory is an adaptation of the theory de-
scribed in Van Eynde 1998, Van Eynde 2000
and Van Eynde (ms.), which integrates a DRT-
1In this paper, we only deal with sentences.
style analysis (Kamp and Reyle 1993) of tense
and aspect into HPSG (Pollard and Sag 1994).
Although from inception, HPSG was aimed at
representing not only syntax, but also seman-
tics and pragmatics, when it comes to practical
implementation, the focus has clearly been on
syntax. In contrast, the adapted theory deals
mainly with semantics and pragmatics. Fur-
thermore, recent research suggests that a direct
implementation of HPSG may not be computa-
tionally viable (Richter, Sailer and Penn 1999).
For these reasons and because of our experi-
ence with it, we have chosen to formulate the
theory in logic, rather than trying to extend
an existing HPSG solution. As such we do not
use typed feature structure, but represent much
the same information in a different way. A for-
mulation in logic should also allow the linguis-
tic knowledge to be easily extended with addi-
tional world knowledge. The extraction of tem-
poral information is performed by constructing
a model of the logical theory, for which we use
an existing abductive procedure. In case of am-
biguities, several models exist and each can be
generated.
We start off with some preliminaries about
the adapted linguistic theory. We will then de-
scribe the knowledge representation language
that we are going to use (essentially first or-
der logic), followed by an extensive explanation
of the representation of the linguistic theory in
logic. We finish off with a short description of
the reasoning procedure used and some exam-
ples of how it can be used on the theory to ex-
tract temporal information.
2 Conceptual framework
We assume familiarity with the following con-
cepts regarding the semantics of tense, aspect
and temporal modification. They correspond
largely to what is found in Kamp and Reyle
(1993).
An eventuality is either an event, a state or
a process. We will not make use of these three
kinds of eventualities, but only of their defining
properties, i.e. stative vs. dynamic and telic vs.
atelic. The eventuality time is the period of time
that the eventuality takes place on. Eventual-
ities are introduced by verbs, but not all verbs
introduce an eventuality. The ones that do are
called substantive, those that do not are called
vacuous (Van Eynde 2000).
Each eventuality also introduces a location
time. The location time is a time with respect
to which the eventuality is located. It is similar
to Reichenbach’s reference time (Reichenbach
1947) and it is used here to express the differ-
ence in effect of both tenses and frame adjuncts
on the eventuality time of telic and atelic even-
tualities. It turns out that by mediating these
effects through the location time, only the rela-
tionship between eventuality time and location
time needs to be telicity dependent.
The utterance time is the time within which
the utterance takes place and, in our theory, it
is assumed to be constant throughout the text.
To explain some phenomena (e.g. transposition,
flashback), we use the temporal perspective time,
which can change from clause to clause.2 We
will from time to time refer to the temporal
perspective time, but it is not essential for un-
derstanding this paper. In most circumstances,
it can be assumed to be part of the utterance
time. It is only in the transposed case that it
will precede the utterance time.
As to adjuncts, our theory is mainly based
on Schelkens et al. (this volume). We distin-
guish between frame or locating adjuncts indi-
cating when an eventuality occurs, and dura-
tional adjuncts expressing how long it takes.3
Amongst the frame adjuncts, we further distin-
guish between deictic adjuncts that refer to the
utterance time (or more generally, to the tempo-
ral perspective time) and independent adjuncts
that refer directly to the time axis. In this pa-
per, we do not deal with the so-called anaphoric
adjuncts.
2See Kamp and Reyle (1993) chapter 5, section 4 or
Van Eynde 1998, p. 245.
3We do not deal with frequency adjuncts in this pa-
per.
3 Representation language
As already mentioned, the theory is represented
in a language that is essentially first order logic
(FOL). It is extended with some axioms and no-
tational conveniences, which will be explained
in this section.
First of all, we want different constants to
represent different entities and, more generally,
we want different functors and functors with dif-
fering arguments to represent different entities.
This means that constants and functors iden-
tify objects; functors can be seen as construc-
tors. To accomplish this, the so-called Unique
Names Axioms (UNA) are added to the theory
(Reiter 1980) (Clark 1978). Since there are an
infinite number of such axioms, they are (im-
plicitly) built into the solver.
Sometimes, however, we want to use open
functions, that is, functions that do not iden-
tify an object, but rather whose result can be
equal to the result of another function. The
particular solver we use, assumes UNA for ev-
ery functor, so we cannot represent an n-ary
open function with a functor. Instead we can
use an (n+ 1)-ary predicate, with the extra ar-
gument representing the result of the function
and with an axiom ensuring the existence and
uniqueness of the function result in function of
its arguments. For example, a binary function
mapping a country and a year to the person
that is or was the president of that country in
that year, would be represented by a ternary
predicate, e.g. pres(USA, 2000,Bill).
We use a special notation for open functions
that also expresses that the arguments and the
result each satisfy a predicate. For example, the
pres function mapping a country and a year to
a person is represented as follows, where the of
indicates the introduction of an open function.
of pres : country( ), year( )→ person( ).(1)
The above declaration is equivalent to a set of
axioms, but it is shorter to write down (and eas-
ier to understand at first glance) and it allows
reasoning procedures working on a specification
to handle such constraints more efficiently. The
more long-winded version is shown in figure 1.
The fol marker indicates that what follows is a
first order logic formula. These axioms express,
first, that for each country and each year, there
is a person that is the president of that country
fol ∀(C, Y ) : country(C) & year(Y )
⇒ ∃(P ) : person(P ) & pres(C, Y, P ).
fol ∀(C, Y,P1,P2) : pres(C, Y,P1) &
pres(C, Y,P2)⇒ P1 = P2.
fol ∀(C, Y, P ) : pres(C, Y, P )
⇒ country(C) & year(Y ).
Figure 1: The open function pres.
in that year. Second, that for a given country
and year, there is at most one president of that
country in that year. Third, that for each in-
stantiation of the president predicate, the first
two arguments are a country and a year respec-
tively.
While FOL is ideally suited to represent as-
sertional knowledge, that is, facts and axioms,
it does not fare so well when it comes to defi-
nitional knowledge, i.e. to defining concepts. A
definition of a concept is an exhaustive enumer-
ation of the cases in which some object belongs
to the concept. We use a notation borrowed
from logic programming. For example, the con-
cept uncle is defined as either a male sibling
(i.e. brother) of a parent or a male spouse of a
(presumably female) sibling of a parent:
uncle(S,C)
← male(S) & sibling(S,P ) &
parent(P,C).
uncle(S,C)
← male(S) &married(S,A) &
sibling(A,P ) & parent(P,C).
(2)
Predicates that are not defined are called open
predicates. Open functions are always open
predicates.
For the simple, non-recursive, definitions we
use in our theory, such a definition is equivalent
to its completion (Clark 1978).4 The comple-
tion of a definition states that a predicate de-
fined in it, holds if and only if one of its cases
holds. That is, the defined predicate, which is
the head of each rule, is equivalent to the dis-
junction of the bodies of the rules. In order to
be able to take the disjunction of the bodies,
the heads have to be identical, of course. To
accomplish this, all terms in an argument posi-
tion of the predicate in the head are first moved
4The equivalence also holds for a certain subset of
recursive definitions.
to the body as an equality to the variable rep-
resenting that argument, and all variables local
to the body are quantified in the body. That is
the set of m rules defining p/n: ∀xi : p(ti)← Fi
is turned into the following equivalence:
∀z : p(z)↔


(∃x1 : z = t1 ∧ F1)
∨
. . .
∨
(∃xm : z = tm ∧ Fm)
(3)
Denecker (2000) presents the extension of clas-
sical logic with a more general notion of (induc-
tive) definitions.
4 Representation
The way in which information can be extracted
from a theory is of course largely dependent on
how the theory is represented. We will therefore
first discuss this representation and only in the
following sections will we present the extraction
part.
This section will mainly focus on the sentence
“[S [NP Ik] [VP [V-AUX ben] [VP [ADV gisteren] [VP
[ADJ ziek] [V-MAIN geweest]]]]]” (I have been sick
yesterday), showing how this sentence is rep-
resented and showing the parts of the theory
needed to extract information from it.5
4.1 Input
The sentence “Ik ben gisteren ziek geweest”
contains three interesting words when it comes
to temporal information, viz. “ben”, “geweest”
en “gisteren”. The first two are both forms of
the verb “zijn” (to be), the last is a temporal
adjunct.
Since our main interest is in semantic inter-
pretation, we assume that any syntactic infor-
mation that is unambiguous and thus indepen-
dent of any further semantic analysis, is avail-
able as input. For this sentence, we have that
“geweest” is the past participle form of “zijn”,
and that it is the main verb of the clause; “ben”
is a present tense of “zijn” and is an auxiliary to
“geweest”; and finally, “gisteren” is an adjunct
in the same clause. Note that in general, when
a clause contains more than one (possibly) sub-
stantive verb, we do not know a priori which of
these verbs is modified by the adjunct.
5Note that in general, there is no direct correspon-
dence between Dutch and English tenses.
To be able to refer to different occurrences of
the same word (such as “zijn” in the example),
we make use of tokens which are arbitrarily cho-
sen constants that represent these occurrences.
In our example sentence (s1), we have verb to-
kens w1 for the main verb and w2 for the auxil-
iary verb, and an adjunct token a1.
To express which word is associated with a to-
ken, we use the verbt word and adjt word pred-
icates. For verbs, we additionally use the morf
predicate to indicate the verb form. Since all of
these are exhaustive enumerations, they are de-
fined predicates. For our example sentence we
have:
verbt word(w1, zijn) ← true.
verbt word(w2, zijn) ← true.
adjt word(a1, gisteren) ← true.
morf(w1, past participle) ← true.
morf(w2, present tense) ← true.
(4)
To express further that s1 is a clause, that w1
is the main verb of s1, that w2 is an auxiliary
verb with w1 as its complement and that a1 is
an adjunct in s1, we use the following:
clause(s1) ← true.
main verb(s1,w1) ← true.
aux verb(w2,w1) ← true.
s adjunct(s1, a1) ← true.
(5)
Here again, we are dealing with exhaustive enu-
merations and thus definitions.
4.2 Eventualities and verbs
An eventuality associated with a verb token is
indicated by the unary evt functor. Not every
such construct really represents an eventuality,
though. Only in the cases where the argument
is a token for a substantive verb, does it refer to
an eventuality. We therefore need an additional
predicate isevt to indicate which evts represent
eventualities.
isevt(evt(W )) ← subst(W ).(6)
Now we still have to define subst itself. There
is only a limited number of verbs that are not
substantive, but we cannot discriminate be-
tween substantive and vacuous verbs on the ba-
sis of the lexeme. For example, “zijn” has (at
least) three uses: one as the main verb of a
clause (v zijn, such as w1), one as a temporal
auxiliary (t zijn, such as w2) and one as an as-
pectual auxiliary (a zijn). Of these, only the
use as a temporal auxiliary is vacuous. Section
4.4 deals with the distinction between temporal
and aspectual auxiliaries.
We consider these three ways of using “zijn”
to be three different verb meanings of the same
verb lexeme. For each verb (meaning), the lex-
icon specifies whether it is substantive or not,
as well as any other property of verbs that is
independent of the actual use of the verb in a
sentence, e.g. whether it is stative or dynamic.
Since the properties of a verb hold for each oc-
currence of that verb, they are inherited by the
verb tokens.
One of the properties of a verb, is the lexeme
used. The verb lex predicate enumerates them
and we naturally only show part of its definition
here.
verb lex(t zijn, zijn) ← true.
verb lex(a zijn, zijn) ← true.
verb lex(v zijn, zijn) ← true.
(7)
This property is not really inherited, but rather
determines of which verb a verb token can be
an occurrence, by placing a constraint on the
open function token verb that maps verb tokens
to their corresponding verbs. The constraint is
that the verb is one of the possible meanings
of the word associated with the verb token, i.e.
that the word of the verb token is the same as
the word of the verb.
of token verb : verb token( )→ verb( ).
fol ∀(T, V,W,L) : token verb(T, V ) &
verbt word(T,W ) & verb lex(V,L).
⇒W = L.
(8)
The verb token and verb predicates merely enu-
merate the verb tokens and verbs respectively.
For each predicate representing one of the
other properties of verbs, there is a correspond-
ing predicate for verb tokens, that is defined to
be that of the verb for which it is a token. The
predicates have the same name, with an extra
verb prefix for the one on verbs. For example,
substantivity of verb tokens (subst) is defined
as the substantivity of the corresponding verb
(verb subst).
subst(W )
← ∃(V ) : token verb(W,V ) &
verb subst(V ).
(9)
Due to the low number of vacuous verbs, it
is simpler to list those instead of all the sub-
stantive ones and then to define the substantive
verbs as those that are not vacuous. We only
show part of the enumeration of vacuous verbs.
verb subst(V ) ← ¬verb vacuous(V ).(10)
verb vacuous(t hebben) ← true.
verb vacuous(t zijn) ← true.
verb vacuous(t zullen) ← true.
(11)
4.3 Periods of time
Part of the objective is to interrelate the differ-
ent times associated with a text, so it is neces-
sary that they are all comparable to each other.
The allowed kinds of periods of time are inter-
vals, denoted by the int predicate, and points,
denoted by the point predicate.
Intervals refer directly to the time axis. They
are represented by a pair of points on the time
axis as arguments to an int functor. This does
not preclude intervals from having no known
end points. The points on the time axis them-
selves can be left unspecified. The relations
between intervals (overlap, within, before and
meets) and some other properties about inter-
vals that we will see later (e.g. day a and hour)
are defined in terms of relations and properties
of these end points. We will not show them
here.
As to the actual representation of points on
the time axis, it is not trivial to find one
that allows efficient processing for all the dif-
ferent kinds of constraints that a text can
place on the intervals that it (implicitly or ex-
plicitly) deals with. For now, we have con-
tented ourselves with a fairly simple one that
is easy to process by humans. Each point on
the axis is represented by a function (ts) of
four integers, the year, the month, the day of
the month and the hour.6 For example, the
whole of May the 21st 1976 is represented as
int(ts(1976, 5, 21, 0), ts(1976, 5, 22, 0)). The re-
lations and properties of these point are in turn
defined in terms of relations on their composing
parts.
Most of the theory is not concerned with the
exact representation of periods of time, but in-
stead only expresses relations between pairs of
6The rather low resolution is due to technical limita-
tions.
such periods through the following predicates.
The relations that can be specified form only a
subset of those in Allen (1983), but are sufficient
for this application.
• overlap, which specifies that its arguments
have a non-empty intersection,
• within, a special case of overlap which spec-
ifies that its first argument is situated com-
pletely within its second argument,
• before, which places its first argument com-
pletely before its second argument, and
• meets, a special case of before which speci-
fies that its first argument immediately pre-
cedes its second argument.
The eventuality time of an eventuality is as-
sociated with it through the evttime predicate.
Similarly, the location time uses the loc pred-
icate. The second argument of both is an in-
terval and is required to be unique for a given
eventuality. This is expressed by the following
axioms:7
fol ∀(E,T ) : evttime(E,T )⇒ int(T ).
fol ∀(E,L) : loc(E,L)⇒ int(L).
fol ∀(E,T1,T2) : evttime(E,T1) &
evttime(E,T2)⇒ (T1 = T2).
fol ∀(E,L1,L2) : loc(E,L1) &
loc(E,L2)⇒ (L1 = L2).
(12)
Each eventuality has both an eventuality time
and a location time associated with it. Next, we
express the overlap relation that generally holds
between these two. The second axiom expresses
the fact that for telic eventualities this overlap
is narrowed down to inclusion.
fol ∀(E) : isevt(E)⇒ (∃(L, T ) :
loc(E,L) & evttime(E,T ) &
overlap(T,L)).
fol ∀(E) : telic(E)⇒ (∃(L, T ) :
loc(E,L) & evttime(E,T ) &
within(T,L)).
(13)
The utterance time is expressed through the
unary utt predicate and is required to exist. Es-
sentially, it is just the eventuality time of some
7The careful reader will have noticed that these are
prime candidates for specification as open functions. The
current solver, however, places rather severe restrictions
on the domain predicate (isevt in this case, as shown in
the next set of axioms), which are not met here.
“utt” eventuality.
fol ∃(U) : utt(U).
utt(U) ← evttime(utt, U).
(14)
Since the temporal perspective time can only
change from clause to clause, each clause has a
unique temporal perspective time and therefore
it can be represented as an (open) function of
clauses.
of s ppp : clause(Z)→ point( ).(15)
In the rest of the theory we will often want to
refer to the temporal perspective time of the
clause that contains a given verb. For conve-
nience, we therefore define another predicate
v ppp, relating verbs to temporal perspective
times. In this definition we use the s verb predi-
cate, which enumerates all the verbs in a clause.
v ppp(W,P )
← ∃(Z) : s verb(Z,W ) &
s ppp(Z,P ).
(16)
4.4 Tenses and auxiliaries
The Dutch language has two simple tenses, the
simple present and the simple past, and several
others that require auxiliaries. Each is iden-
tified by a sequence of auxiliaries, each hav-
ing the next as a complement (the last has the
main verb as its complement), and the tense
of the first auxiliary. Actually, it is a sequence
of classes of auxiliaries (e.g. an auxiliary of the
perfect or an auxiliary of the future). In our ex-
ample sentence, “Ik ben gisteren ziek geweest”,
there is one auxiliary (w2, “zijn”) and it is one
of the perfect. The tense of this auxiliary is the
present tense.
Only some verbs are auxiliaries and there
are several kinds of auxiliaries (e.g. perfect, fu-
ture). This information is represented by the
verb aux kind predicate. For example, both
uses of “zijn” as an auxiliary are auxiliaries of
the perfect.
verb aux kind(t zijn, perfect) ← true.
verb aux kind(a zijn, perfect) ← true.
(17)
As with the other properties of verbs, the aux-
iliary kind of a verb is inherited by the verb
tokens (as the aux kind predicate). Here, we
need to place an extra (indirect) constraint
on the token verb predicate. The tokens that
appear as an auxiliary in the sentence (i.e.
∃(W2) : aux verb(W,W2)) should be precisely
those whose verb is an auxiliary (i.e. ∃(F ) :
aux kind(W,F )).
fol ∀(W ) : (∃(W2) : aux verb(W,W2))
⇔ (∃(F ) : aux kind(W,F )).
(18)
This brings us to another distinction among
auxiliaries made in the adapted theory and that
is the one between temporal (e.g. t zijn) and as-
pectual (e.g. a zijn) auxiliaries. Temporal aux-
iliaries have a purely temporal meaning and
do not introduce an eventuality (i.e. they are
vacuous). Aspectual auxiliaries, on the other
hand, have a temporal influence only indirectly
through the eventualities they introduce. For
example, the auxiliaries of the perfect can be
either temporal or aspectual. The temporal
perfect auxiliary requires the location time of
the verb it has as a complement to be situated
before the temporal perspective time, whereas
the aspectual perfect auxiliary introduces a new
eventuality that represents the resulting state of
what its complement represents.
Both the temporal auxiliaries and the tenses
stipulate a relation between the location time
of an eventuality and the temporal perspective
time. For temporal auxiliaries it is the eventu-
ality of the complement whose location time is
constrained, for the tenses it is the eventuality
of the tensed verb, in case it is substantive.
In our current theory, there are three kinds
of relations that can hold between a location
time and the temporal perspective time, which
we have succinctly called before, not before and
after. Note that these names give only a rough
idea. Further down in this section, we will show
what exactly they imply. It turns out that the
temporal perfect and the past tense have the
same effect in this regard, namely the before
relation.
There is a slight complication though, and
that is that in case of transposition, the past
tense specifies a before relation between the
temporal perspective time and the utterance
time, between which, as you may remember,
normally holds an inclusion relation. Due to
this, the transposed past tense does not spec-
ify a before relation between location time and
temporal perspective time, but behaves rather
evt ppp(W, before) ← subst(W ) &morf(W, past tense) & ¬transposed(W ) ∨
(∃(A) : aux kind(A, perfect) & ¬subst(A) & aux verb(A,W )).
evt ppp(W,not before) ← subst(W ) & (morf(W, past tense) & transposed(W )) ∨
morf(W, present tense).
evt ppp(W, after) ← ∃(A) : aux kind(A, futurate) & aux verb(A,W ).
Figure 2: Relation between temporal perspective time and eventuality time.
like the present tense on this level, which we
have called the “not before” relation. For com-
pleteness, we mention that the futurate auxil-
iary specifies an after relation. All this leads to
the definition for the relation between location
time and temporal perspective time shown in
figure 2.
As you can see, for each clause there is ex-
actly one eventuality whose location time is re-
lated to the temporal perspective time, either
that of the tensed verb in case it is substantive
or that of the complement of the (vacuous) tem-
poral auxiliary. You may wonder what happens
when a temporal auxiliary has the past tense.
The above definition seems to allow that this
past tense has no effect (the present tense has
indeed no effect, but you would not be surprised
about that). As it happens, the past tense for
a temporal auxiliary, can only be a transposed
past tense and in this case the other relation, i.e.
the one between temporal perspective time and
utterance time comes into play, as we discussed
above. We give the definition of this relation
and the axiom enforcing the transposedness:
ppp utt(W, before)
← morf(W, past tense) & transposed(W ).
ppp utt(W, at)
← morf(W, present tense) ∨
morf(W, past tense) & ¬transposed(W ).
fol ∀(W ) : morf(W, past tense) & ¬subst(W )
⇒ transposed(W ).
(19)
We cannot go into the circumstances under
which transposition arises, we merely define it
here as an “abnormality”, where abnormal is an
open predicate:
transposed(W )
← abnormal(ab transposed(W )).
(20)
As we already hinted at in section 4.2, the
auxiliary (w2) in our example sentence can only
be interpreted as a temporal auxiliary, but we
have shown no rule that would preclude it from
being interpreted as an aspectual one, simply
because we have not shown the rule for the as-
pectual perfect. So here it is:
fol ∀(W,C) : aux kind(W, perfect) &
subst(W ) & aux verb(W,C)
⇒ ¬stative(evt(C)) &
result(evt(C), evt(W )).
(21)
As already explained, the axiom states that the
aspectual (substantive) perfect introduces the
resulting state of the eventuality of its comple-
ment. Additionally, in the theory, there is a re-
quirement for the complement to be non-stative,
which is why w2 cannot be aspectual, since in
our example sentence, w1 is stative. The defi-
nition of the stative predicate is similar to the
subst one shown in section 4.2.
The result predicate in the above axiom is
an open predicate expressing that the second
argument represents the resulting state of the
first argument. This implies that the resulting
state immediately follows the eventuality that
it is a resulting state for.
fol ∀(E,E2, L,L2) : result(E,E2) &
evttime(E,L) & evttime(E2,L2)
⇒ meets(L,L2).
(22)
Now, as promised, the implications of the
evt ppp and ppp utt relations. For the ppp utt
relation, before means exactly what you would
expect and at means inclusion of the temporal
perspective time in the utterance time.
fol ∀(U,W,P ) : ppp utt(W, before) &
v ppp(W,P ) & utt(U)
⇒ before(P,U).
fol ∀(U,W,P ) : ppp utt(W, at) &
v ppp(W,P ) & utt(U)
⇒ within(P,U).
(23)
For the evt ppp relation, not before means non
precedence. (There are some further specialisa-
tions of this relation in restricted circumstance,
but we will not show them here.) The before
and after cases should be intuitively clear.
fol ∀(W,P,L) : evt ppp(W, before) &
loc(evt(W ), L) & v ppp(W,P )
⇒ before(L,P ).
fol ∀(W,P,L) : evt ppp(W,not before) &
loc(evt(W ), L) & v ppp(W,P )
⇒ ¬before(L,P ).
fol ∀(W,P,L) : evt ppp(W, after) &
loc(evt(W ), L) & v ppp(W,P )
⇒ before(P,L).
(24)
4.5 Adjuncts
Although we currently deal with only a few ad-
juncts, we have tried to be as general as possi-
ble in our treatment of them. Our main design
decisions were to have compositionality and to
avoid redundancy. This means that we asso-
ciate with an adjunct (token) only what the ad-
junct itself adds to the meaning of the sentence
and we want to treat what is common to several
adjuncts, separately.
For example, the adjunct “gisteren” (yester-
day), is a frame adjunct that refers to the day
before the day that includes the temporal per-
spective time. That is, the adjunct specifies a
relation between some external period of time
(in case of deictic adjuncts such as “gisteren”,
the temporal perspective time) and the period
of time that it introduces. Anaphoric adjuncts,
which, as we already mentioned, we do not deal
with in this paper, specify a relation between
some other period of time and the period of time
that they introduce.
We therefore generalise that for frame ad-
juncts, the meaning is this relation between a
contextual parameter and the introduced period
of time. To represent this, a tuple consisting of
the two periods of time is associated with the
adjunct and the relation between them is en-
forced by an axiom. This is the axiom that
expresses the “gisteren” relation as explained
above:
fol ∀(A) : adjt word(A, gisteren)
⇒ (∃(P, Y, T ) : day a(Y ) & day a(T ) &
within(P, T ) &meets(Y, T ) &
time period(A, ta frame(deictic(P ), Y ))).
(25)
The ta frame functor specifies that the adjunct
is a frame adjunct. Its first argument, the con-
textual parameter, is a functor deictic, which
indicates that its only argument (ultimately)
refers to the temporal perspective time of some
clause. Note that the axiom only requires the
existence of this period P , which only at a later
stage will be identified with some temporal per-
spective time, by an axiom shown later in this
subsection. Independent frame adjuncts will
have the constant independent instead of the
deictic functor.
In general, each adjunct has some (unique)
construct associated with it. This means that
time period is an open function of an adjunct.
Since the different axioms specify what the func-
tion result is, it is left unspecified in the decla-
ration of time period as an open function.
adjunctoid(A) ← ∃(L) : adjt word(A,L).
anything( ) ← true.
of time period : adjunctoid( )→ anything( ).
(26)
As you can see, we do not only associate a time
period with adjuncts, but with anything that
“looks” like an adjunct (adjunctoid), which is
anything that occurs as a first argument to the
adjt word predicate. We will show the use of
that later in this subsection.
The effect of a frame adjunct is that the lo-
cation time of the modified verb is required to
be within the frame period:
fol ∀(W,T,R,L) :
verb time(W, ta frame(R,T )) & loc(evt(W ), L)
⇒ within(L, T ).
(27)
Here, again, we use an auxiliary predicate
verb time, which associates the time period in-
formation to the verb that is modified:
verb time(W,P )
← ∃(A) : verb adjunct(W,A) &
time period(A,P ).
(28)
When it is a deictic adjunct that modifies a
verb, we still have to require that the contex-
tual parameter is in fact the temporal perspec-
tive time:
fol ∀(V,A,K,P ) :
verb time(V, ta frame(deictic(A),K)) &
v ppp(V, P )⇒ A = P.
(29)
The time period also allows for some more
complicated uses, for example, na (after) fol-
lowed by something that could be used as a
frame adjunct. The use of na indicates that the
location time of the modified verb is situated af-
ter the period of time of the complement of the
preposition. This can be modelled as inclusion
in a frame interval that immediately succeeds
the frame interval of the complement. The con-
textual dependency is determined by the com-
plement and therefore it is left unchanged.
fol ∀(A,B,C, F ) : adjunct(A,na(B)) &
time period(B, ta frame(C,F ))
⇒ (∃(T ) : meets(F, T ) &
time period(A, ta frame(C, T ))).
(30)
In the input, na gisteren would be specified as
follows:
adjt word(a1, gisteren) ← true.
adjt word(a2,na(a1)) ← true.
s adjunct(s1, a2) ← true.
(31)
As for durational adjuncts, we can only repre-
sent so called in-adjuncts so far, and not the for-
adjuncts. The cause of this is that for-adjuncts
require the eventuality of the verb they modify
to be atelic in itself, but combined with the for-
adjunct, the eventuality would be telic. Now,
one and the same eventuality can obviously not
be both telic and atelic, so the adjunct would
have to introduce a new eventuality and we do
not handle such things yet.
Handling in is done in much the same way as
na, except that there is a change in type instead
of a change in interval, since the complement of
in when used by itself is not an in-adjunct.
fol ∀(A,B,C, T ) : adjunct(A, in(B)) &
time period(B, ta dur(T ))
⇒ time period(A, ta in(T )).
(32)
An in-adjunct requires its corresponding even-
tuality to have taken at most as much time as
specified by its complement.
fol ∀(W,T,L) :
verb time(W, ta in(T )) & evttime(evt(W ), L)
⇒ telic(evt(W )) & within(L, T ).
(33)
This is again similar to the frame adjunct con-
straint, the difference being that it requires a
telic eventuality and that, here, the eventual-
ity time is constrained directly, instead of indi-
rectly through the location time. The location
time could of course be used here as well, since,
for telic eventualities, the eventuality time is re-
stricted to be within the location time, but there
is no need to here.
An example of a complement of in would be
een uur (an hour):
fol ∀(A) : adjt word(A, een uur)
⇒ (∃(T ) : hour(T ) &
time period(A, independent, ta dur(T ))).
(34)
Here, the hour predicate means that its argu-
ment has a duration of exactly one hour.
5 Reasoning procedure
Up to this point, we have presented a logic the-
ory consisting of FOL axioms and definitions in
which some predicates were defined and others
open, but we have not shown how to derive in-
formation from this theory. Since the defined
predicates are known, the only uncertainty lies
in the open predicates. We need to find an inter-
pretation for these open predicates that is con-
sistent with the theory. In other words, we need
to generate a model for the open predicates. To
do this we use an existing abductive procedure,
called SLDNFA (Denecker and Van Nuffelen
1999), which operates on theories written in the
knowledge representation language outlined in
section 3.
Abduction is a form of non-monotonic rea-
soning that is used to explain observations. In
this case, an explanation consists of a model for
the open predicates. As a trivial example, take
the definition of transposed in section 20. Sup-
pose we somehow observe transposed(evt(w1 )),
then we can explain this by assuming (abduc-
ing) abnormal(ab transposed(evt(w1 ))). This
form of reasoning is called non-monotonic, be-
cause new information may invalidate previ-
ously drawn conclusions. (This in contrast
to deduction, where any conclusion that was
drawn, can always still be drawn after the addi-
tion of new information.) For example, should
we add the axiom
fol ¬abnormal(ab transposed(evt(w1))).(35)
then we would not be able to draw the same
conclusion, as it would be inconsistent. (This
is not a problem for deduction, since we can
deduce anything from an inconsistent theory.)
We cannot give a detailed explanation of how
the SLDNFA procedure works within this lim-
ited space, but we do want to give an idea of it.
In short, the procedure tries to make the con-
junction of all axioms and the (possibly empty)
observation (query) hold by abducing a set of
atoms, according to the following rules. A con-
junction holds if all of its conjuncts hold; for
a disjunction, it is sufficient that one of its dis-
juncts holds, so each one is tried out until one is
found that holds. Negation is distributed over
disjunctions and conjunctions. A defined predi-
cate is replaced by its completion (see section 3).
When an open predicate occurs negatively,
the atom is (temporarily) assumed not to hold
if this does not conflict with earlier made as-
sumptions. If it is part of a disjunction, the
remaining disjuncts are remembered in case it
turns out we want it to hold after all. When an
open predicate occurs positively, the atom is as-
sumed to hold and any applicable remembered
disjunction is required to hold as well. If the
atom was already assumed not to hold and there
were no remaining disjuncts at that point, the
procedure backtracks to the latest disjunction
with remaining disjuncts. Finally, an equality
unifies its arguments. If this fails, the proce-
dure backtracks as well.
Numerical operations and comparisons are
translated into CLP (Constraint Logic Pro-
gramming) constraints and handed over to an
efficient constraint solver. They occur mainly in
the definitions and axioms pertaining to points
on the time axis, which we have not shown in
this paper. At the end, all numerical variables
are labelled, which means that they get a value
assigned to them that satisfies all constraints.
6 Deriving temporal information
Applying the procedure of section 5 to our the-
ory with an empty observation (that is, we just
want a consistent interpretation for the open
predicates) for our example sentence “Ik ben
gisteren ziek geweest”, we get the following re-
sult, which lists for each open predicate pre-
cisely its model:
adjunct_verb : [adjunct_verb(a1,w1)]
evttime :
[evttime(evt(w1),int(ts(1999,1,1,0),
ts(1999,1,2,0))),
evttime(utt,int(ts(1999,1,1,0),
ts(1999,1,3,0)))]
loc :
[loc(evt(w1),int(ts(1999,1,1,0),
ts(1999,1,2,0)))]
s_ppp : [s_ppp(s1,int(ts(1999,1,2,0),
ts(1999,1,2,1)))]
time_period : [time_period(a1,
ta_frame(deictic(
int(ts(1999,1,2,0),ts(1999,1,2,1))),
int(ts(1999,1,1,0),ts(1999,1,2,0))))]
token_verb : [token_verb(w2,t_zijn),
token_verb(w1,v_zijn)]
The w1 and w2 tokens were abduced to be
tokens for the verb v zijn and the temporal aux-
iliary t zijn, respectively. As explained in sec-
tion 4.4 this is in fact the only possibility for
the token verb predicate for this particular sen-
tence. The only adjunct (a1) in the sentence
was taken to modify the main verb (w1), which
is again the only possibility here, since the tem-
poral auxiliary is vacuous. This model is unique
upto the choice of the intervals. In case of am-
biuguities, several models are generated.
Since no information was given about the
time, the time intervals are chosen rather ar-
bitrarily, although they do of course satisfy the
constraints. The temporal perspective time is
the first hour of January the second, 1999. It
is included in the utterance time, which, as
you can see, is rather large, stretching over two
days.8 The temporal perspective time is fur-
ther the deictic argument relative to which “gis-
teren” (yesterday) is positioned. This January
the first includes the location time of the even-
tuality associated with w1 (the whole day, here),
which in turn includes the eventuality time (also
the whole day, here).
Suppose that you know that the sickness
lasted from 6 o’clock until 8 o’clock in the
evening on May the 21st, 2000 and that the ut-
terance time lasted an hour, you would give the
following observation (query) to the system:
utt(U) & hour(U) &
evttime(evt(w1), int(ts(2000, 5, 21, 18)
ts(2000, 5, 21, 20)))
(36)
8Maybe some general restriction should be placed on
the extent of the utterance time.
The result is, as you would expect, that the ut-
terance happened on May the 22nd. We only
show the result for the evttime predicate; the
other time intervals are changed accordingly.
evttime :
[evttime(utt,int(ts(2000,5,22,0),
ts(2000,5,22,1))),
evttime(evt(w1),int(ts(2000,5,21,18),
ts(2000,5,21,20)))]
An example of another kind of query, is the
following. Is it possible for the utterance to have
taken place before the eventuality described by
w1 ?
utt(U) & evttime(evt(w1), T ) &
before(U, T )
(37)
The result:
no
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown a formalisation
in first order logic of an existing theory about
temporal information in Dutch texts. Although
to a large extent, this theory had already been
formalised in HPSG, it had not been practically
implemented as such.
The representation shown in this paper has
effectively been implemented and results of us-
ing an abductive reasoning procedure on it were
presented. Although the problems dealt with in
this paper were limited, the experiments show
that abduction may be viable for natural lan-
guage processing.
A representation in logic is not only very flex-
ible and extensible, a good representation also
requires the use of well thought out concepts,
because of logic’s clear and formal semantics.
This representation has already helped in clear-
ing out the meaning of some concepts used in
the temporal analysis of sentences.
The research that led to this paper has also
been an exercise in knowledge representation
and will contribute towards a better knowledge
representation methodology.
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